

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01     BERLIN 06701 01 OF 02 160959Z

21

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 IO-13 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06

ACDA-07 SAJ-01 FEA-01 INT-05 OES-06 EB-07 COME-00

TRSE-00 OMB-01 /100 W

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R 151701Z SEP 76

FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3258

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

USMISSION USBERLIN

TO RUFHNA/USMISSION NATO 7405

USMISSION USUN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 BERLIN 6701

E O 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PLOS, GE, NO. US

SUBJ: FAREWELL CALL ON EGIL AMLIE, NORWEGIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE  
GDR

1. YESTERDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, I CALLED ON THE NORWEGIAN  
AMBASSADOR TO THE GDR, EGIL AMLIE. OUR TALK LASTED ABOUT  
ONE HOUR AS HE SEEMED ANXIOUS TO STATE THE POSITION OF  
NORWAY ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES.

2. US/NORWEGIAN RELATIONS

HE EMPHASIZED AGAIN AND AGAIN THE RELATIONS WERE  
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PAGE 02     BERLIN 06701 01 OF 02 160959Z

WHOLLY SATISFACTORY AND THAT HE WANTED ME TO REPORT THAT,

WITH THE EXCEPTION OF A FEW PROFESSIONAL DEMONSTRATORS VERY SMALL IN NUMBER, NORWAY AND ITS PEOPLE KNEW THAT THEIR SOLE RELIANCE FOR SECURITY DEPENDED UPON THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US. THIS HAD BEEN EMPHASIZED BY THEIR SUPPORT OF NATO AS THERE WAS NO STRONGER SUPPORTER OF NATO THAN NORWAY. HE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH PRESIDENT FORD'S RECENT STATEMENT AGAINST WITHDRAWAL OF US FORCES AND CONFIDENCE THE CONGRESS WOULD REALIZE MORE AND MORE THAT WITHOUT US PARTICIPATION IN NATO THERE COULD BE NO CREDIBLE DETERRENT TO SOVIET UNION MILITARY AND POLITICAL PURPOSES IN WESTERN EUROPE.

3. HE SAID NORWAY, WHILE FAITHFULLY SUPPORTING NATO AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE US, HAD BECOME, AS HE HAD, MORE NATIONALISTIC. HE ILLUSTRATED BY REFERRING TO THE REASONS THAT NORWAY HAD BEEN UNWILLING, ALTHOUGH PRESSURED TO DO SO TO BECOME A MEMBER OF THE EEC. THE EEC WAS A GREAT VALUE BUT CONSIDERING THE DIFFERING OPINIONS OF ITS MEMBERS AND THE ATTITUDE OF SOME, PARTICULARLY FRANCE, TOWARD THE US, NORWAY DID NOT WANT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN ITS PROBLEMS.

#### 4. NORWAY'S OIL RESOURCES

NORWAY HAD BEEN THE POOREST SCANDINAVIAN AND NORTHERN EUROPEAN COUNTRY. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS OIL RESOURCES OFFERED IT AN OPPORTUNITY TO PROGRESS INDUSTRIALLY, BUT WITH RESTRAINTS WHICH NORWAY WOULD EFFECT. WHILE NORWAY'S RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE SOVIET UNION, WERE GOOD, HE CONSIDERED THAT ENGLAND, SWEDEN, THE FRG, AND THE NETHERLANDS THOUGH THAT NORWAY MIGHT BE SELFISH ABOUT THE RETENTION OF SUCH OIL AS WAS NECESSARY FOR ITS OWN DEVELOPMENT. THIS WAS NORWEGIAN POLICY, BUT WITH THE EXCEPTION OF MAINTAINING RESERVES, IT WOULD CONTRIBUTE RESOURCES TO ASSIST IN MEETING THE WORLD ENERGY PROBLEM. HE SPOKE OF FORMER INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS WHICH LIMITS A COUNTRY'S CONTINENTAL SHELF TO AN AREA WHICH IS NO MORE THAN 500 METERS IN SEA DEPTH. THE PROBLEM IN THE NORTH SEA IS THAT NO PLACE, WITH A FEW POSSIBLE

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03      BERLIN 06701 01 OF 02 160959Z

EXCEPTIONS, DOES THE DEPTH EXCEED 500 METERS. THEREFORE, THE CLAIMS OF COUNTRIES ABUTTING ON THE NORTH SEA HAD TO BE SETTLED BY A MEDIAN LINE BETWEEN THESE COUNTRIES FOR EXPLOITATION OF OIL RESOURCES.

#### 5. FISHING RIGHTS

AS REGARDS THE ATLANTIC SHELF AND ARCTIC OCEAN SHELF,

NORWAY, AS THE US, HAD ESTABLISHED A 200-MILE ECONOMIC ZONE. AMBASSADOR AMLIE SAID THAT SINCE NORWAY DID NOT HAVE MUCH FAITH IN THE SUCCESS OF THE LOS CONFERENCE, IT HAD BEEN PROCEEDING FOR SOME TIME TO MAKE ITS OWN ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE USE OF ITS 200-MILE ZONE. IT HAD AGREED TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GDR, FRG, DENMARK, THE NETHERLANDS, AND THE UK ON WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS "TRANSITIONAL AGREEMENTS". NORWAY WOULD AGREE TO A TWO-YEAR PERIOD IN WHICH THESE COUNTRIES, WHICH HAD USED THEM AS TRADITIONAL FISHING GROUNDS, WOULD BE PERMITTED TO FISH IN THAT AREA OF THE ECONOMIC ZONE EXTENDING 50 MILES FROM THE ATLANTIC NORWEGIAN COAST. SUCH FISHING WOULD BE COMPLETELY UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF NORWAY AND CERTAIN AREAS, WHOSE FISHING STOCKS HAD BEEN SERIOUSLY DEPLETED, WOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM ALL FISHING. NORWAY WOULD AGREE TO A FOUR-YEAR AGREEMENT RESPECTING THE ADDITIONAL 150 MILES OF NORWAY'S 200-MILE ZONE WITH STRONG SUPERVISION AND CONTROL BY NORWAY. THE PURPOSE OF THE TRANSITIONAL AGREEMENTS WAS TO DETERMINE IF THE CONDITIONS IMPOSED BY NORWAY WERE FAITHFULLY OBSERVED AND TO WHAT EXTENT FISHING IN THESE AREAS RESULTED IN A FURTHER DEPLETION OF SPECIES STOCKS. DECISIONS REGARDING THE CONTINUATION OF THESE AGREEMENTS BEYOND THE 2 AND 4-YEAR LIMITATIONS WOULD DEPEND UPON THE CONTRACTING PARTIES' OBSERVATION OF NORWAY'S CONDITIONS, AND RESPECT OF ITS SUPERVISION AUTHORITY. AMLIE THOUGHT THAT, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE GDR WHICH NEEDED FISHING RIGHTS FOR NECESSARY FOOD FOR ITS OWN PEOPLE, THE OTHER COUNTRIES RATHER RESENTED NORWAY'S POSITION.

6. AMLIE SAID THE SOVIET UNION DID LITTLE FISHING ALONG THE ATLANTIC COAST OF NORWAY. ITS PROBLEMS  
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 04     BERLIN 06701 01 OF 02 160959Z

WITH RUSSIA CONCERNED FISHING IN THE ARCTIC OCEAN. NORWAY'S POSITION WAS THAT ITS CONTROL AREA WAS BOUNDED BY A LINE INITIATING AT THE NORWEGIAN/RUSSIAN BOUNDARY AND EXTENDING DIRECTLY TO THE NORTH POLE. RUSSIAN CLAIMED RIGHTS IN AN AREA IMPINGING ON THIS NORWEGIAN ARCTIC OCEAN AREA, AND IT WAS CONTINUING TO FISH IN THIS AREA. FURTHER, IT CONSISTENTLY FIRED ROCKETS FROM ITS MAINLAND INTO THIS DISPUTED AREA, AS HE THOUGHT, TO GIVE WEIGHT TO ITS CLAIM IN THE AREA AND TO INTIMIDATE NORWAY. AMLIE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH NORWAY IS A SMALL COUNTRY, IT WILL CONTINUE TO INSIST ON ITS POSITION FROM WHICH IT WILL NEVER DEVIATE WITHOUT A SATISFACTORY NORWEGIAN-SOVIET UNION AGREEMENT. HE THOUGHT THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY THAT A STRONG POSITION IN NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT RESOLVE THE QUESTION.

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PAGE 01 BERLIN 06701 02 OF 02 161140Z

41

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 IO-13 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07

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FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3259

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 BERLIN 6701

7. AS TO THE REMAINING ISSUES NOW BEING CONSIDERED IN THE LOS CONFERENCE, AMLIE BELIEVED THAT THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION HAD SIMILAR PROBLEMS REGARDING PASSAGE THROUGH STRAITS, THAT JAPAN WOULD SUFFER TREMENDOUSLY, ECONOMICALLY AND OTHERWISE, IF FREE PASSAGE COULD NOT BE ESTABLISHED. THUS HE BELIEVED THAT THE SIMILAR POSITIONS OF THE US, THE SOVIET UNION AND JAPAN COULD HAVE INFLUENCE IN SETTLING THIS ISSUE. HE DID NOT SEE MUCH HOPE FOR A SETTLEMENT OF THE DEEP SEA ISSUE BECAUSE OF THE INTRANSIGENCE OF COUNTRIES THAT HAD NO REOURCES FOR ITS DEVELOPMENT. IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT UNLESS AN AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED, WHICH WAS DOUBTFUL, THAT IT WOULD DEVELOP INTO A SITUATION OF "EVERY MAN FOR

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02     BERLIN 06701 02 OF 02 161140Z

HIMSELF" WITH PROBLEMS WHICH COULD LAST FOR YEARS.

8. NORWEGIAN/GDR RELATIONSHIP

AMBASSADOR AMLIE NOTED THAT WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE AGREEMENT TO NEGOTIATE FISHERIES THERE HAD BEEN LITTLE PROGRESS. HE HAD COME TO THE GDR WITH AN OBJECTIVE MIND BUT HIS EXPERIENCE HAD BEEN ONE OF GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT, EVEN BEYOND THAT WHICH HE HAD EXPECTED, BECAUSE OF THE SERVILITY OF THE GDR TO THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS FLAGRANT PROPAGANDIZING AND REVISION OF HISTORY. IN SUCH CONTACTS AS HE HAD WITH GDR OFFICIALS HE HAD DECIDED TO TAKE A VERY HARD LINE. HE HAD TOLD THEM THAT THE NAZIS HAD OVER-RUN EUROPE AND HIS OWN COUNTRY, AND THAT THEY KNEW THAT THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH ARMIES HAD LIBERATED ALL OF THE FRG AND OVER ONE HALF OF THE PRESENT AREA OF THE GDR. ALSO THE GREAT BRITIAN, AND NOT THE SOVIET UNION, HAD BEEN THE COUNTRY WHICH HAD ALONE STOOD FROM THE BEGINNING AGAINST THE NAZIS. HE WAS AMAZED TO FIND THAT THE RESPONSE OF THE GDR OFFICIALS WAS THAT THE PEOPLE OF THE GDR WERE NOT NAZIS, AND THAT THE NAZIS WERE FROM THE FRG. HE HAD TOLD THEM THIS WAS NOT TRUE, AS THEY WELL KNEW. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE BELIEVES THAT THE GDR PROGAGANDA AND ITS REVISION OF HISTORY AND TRUTH WERE NOW BEING BELIEVED BY THAT PART OF THE GDR POPULATION WHICH WAS VERY YOUNG DURING WORLD WAR II AND THOSE WHO HAD BEEN BORN SINCE THE WAR.

9. HE THOUGHT THAT THE POLICY OF DETENTE, IF IT IS STRICTLY INTERPRETED BY WESTERN EUROPE, AND ABOVE ALL THE US, MUST BE ONE OF MUTUALITY, AND INSISTENCE ON MUTUALITY. NEVERTHELESS, THE MAINTENANCE OF DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS IN WESTERN EUROPE AND ECONOMIC STABILITY DEPENDED PRIMARILY ON SECURITY, AND SUCH SECURITY WAS ULTIMATELY DEPENDENT UPON THE US.

10. AMBASSADOR AMLIE TOLD ME THAT HE EXPECTED TO LEAVE THE GDR THE LATTER PART OF THIS YEAR AND WOULD BECOME DIRECTOR OF A LEGAL DIVISION IN NORWAY DEALING WITH THE LAW OF THE SEA ISSUES AND WITH HARD NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION REGARDING THEIR CLAIMS IN THE  
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PAGE 03     BERLIN 06701 02 OF 02 161140Z

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